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Abstract
Background: Dissociative identity disorder (DID) is a disputed psychiatric disorder. Research findings and clinical
observations suggest that DID involves an authentic mental disorder related to factors such as traumatization and disrupted
attachment. A competing view indicates that DID is due to fantasy proneness, suggestibility, suggestion, and role-playing.
Here we examine whether dissociative identity state-dependent psychobiological features in DID can be induced in high or
low fantasy prone individuals by instructed and motivated role-playing, and suggestion.
Methodology/Principal Findings: DID patients, high fantasy prone and low fantasy prone controls were studied in two
different types of identity states (neutral and trauma-related) in an autobiographical memory script-driven (neutral or
trauma-related) imagery paradigm. The controls were instructed to enact the two DID identity states. Twenty-nine subjects
participated in the study: 11 patients with DID, 10 high fantasy prone DID simulating controls, and 8 low fantasy prone DID
simulating controls. Autonomic and subjective reactions were obtained. Differences in psychophysiological and neural
activation patterns were found between the DID patients and both high and low fantasy prone controls. That is, the identity
states in DID were not convincingly enacted by DID simulating controls. Thus, important differences regarding regional
cerebral bloodflow and psychophysiological responses for different types of identity states in patients with DID were upheld
after controlling for DID simulation.
Conclusions/Significance: The findings are at odds with the idea that differences among different types of dissociative
identity states in DID can be explained by high fantasy proneness, motivated role-enactment, and suggestion. They indicate
that DID does not have a sociocultural (e.g., iatrogenic) origin.
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Introduction
Despite its inclusion in the Diagnostic Manual for Mental
Disorders [1], the genuineness of dissociative identity disorder
(DID) continues to be disputed. Supporters of the diametrically
opposed trauma-related and non-trauma-related views have been
engaged since decades in a passionate debate regarding its
validity as a mental disorder, and whether it is related to
traumatization or to fantasy proneness, suggestibility, suggestion,
and simulation [2–10].
The non-trauma-related position [2,3,7,11–13], also referred to
as the sociocognitive model of DID [14–16], holds that DID is a
simulation caused by high suggestibility and/or fantasy proneness
[17–21], suggestive psychotherapy and other suggestive sociocul-
tural influences (e.g., the media and/or the church). According to
this model, ‘‘[t]he rules for enacting the [DID] role […] are as
follows: (a) Behave as if you are two (or more) separate people who
inhabit the same body. (b) Act as if the you I have been addressing
thus far is one of those people and as if the you I have been talking
to is unaware of the other coinhabitants. (c) When I provide a
signal for contacting another coinhabitant, act as though you are
another person. To the extent that patients behave in terms of
these rules, the ‘‘classic’’ symptoms [of DID] follow by implication
and do not have to be taught through direct instruction or further
suggestion’’, Spanos (p.239 [15]). Fantasy proneness and suggest-
ibility are highly correlated [18,22–25], and dissociative symptoms
were found to be correlated with fantasy proneness, heightened
suggestibility, and susceptibility to pseudomemories [11,26].
To date, the position that DID is caused by sociocultural factors
and personal features such as fantasy proneness has not been
tested in studies involving DID patients, and evidence that the
complex phenomenology and psychobiology of DID can be
created and sustained over time by these factors is lacking [27–30].
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fantasy based model of DID is influential in contemporary
psychiatry and there have been proposals to prevent the inclusion
of DID in the DSM-V [31].
The trauma-related perspective entails that DID is related to a
combination of factors that include chronic emotional neglect and
emotional, physical, and/or sexual abuse from early childhood,
insufficient integrative capacity, attachment disorder, and lack of
affect-regulation by caretakers [27,32–35]. In this view DID is
thought to be at the far end of the spectrum of trauma-related
psychiatric disorders, i.e. being a severe form of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) [33,36].
Holders of the trauma-related view acknowledge that: some
features of dissociative identity states can be influenced by
sociocultural factors [33], that false positive cases of DID have
evolved in a treatment setting, and that some psychiatric patients
imitate DID [37]. However, they also note that there are
differences between authentic and imitated DID and that there
is no evidence that DID can (sub-)consciously be created by
sociocultural factors [27]. Furthermore, even if DID symptoms
can be created iatrogenically or enacted [14] this does not mean
that genuine trauma-related DID does not exist [38].
According to the DSM-IV [1], DID is characterized by, among
others, the presence of two or more distinct `identities’ or
`personality states’. Different proposed labels include `different
emotional states’,`alters’,`dissociative parts of the personality’ [33],
and `dissociative identity states.’ Following previously used
descriptions and terminology [39,40] different types of dissociative
identity states are indicated here as neutral identity states (NIS)
and trauma-related identity states (TIS). These indicators are
derived from the terms ‘apparently normal part of the personality
(ANP)’ and ‘emotional part of the personality (EP)’ respectively,
which are used in the theory of structural dissociation [33,41].
This theory defines dissociation as a division of personality into
different types of subsystems, each with their own first-person
perspective, that is, their own point of view as to who they are,
what the world is like, and how they relate to that world [42]. As
NIS DID patients concentrate on functioning in daily life,
commonly try to hide their pathology, and have not sufficiently
integrated (e.g., have partial or complete amnesia) traumatic
memories. That is, NIS fails to relate the trauma-related nature to
its self [39]. In contrast, TIS does have conscious access to these
memories, recalls them as personal experiences and is bodily and
emotionally affected by them. That is, as TIS the patients are
fixated in traumatic memories and engage in defensive actions
such as freeze and flight, when they are or feel threatened [41,43],
thereby activating fast subcortical response routes in the brain
[40,44]. TIS who engage in active kinds of physical defence (e.g.,
freeze, flight, fight) would involve dominance of the sympathetic
nervous system, whereas those who engage in total submission
(i.e.,playing dead) would be primarily mediated by the dorsal vagal
branch of the parasympathetic nervous system [45].
Proponents of the sociocognitive view have argued that the
different patterns of subjective, psychophysiological, and neural
activity for NIS and TIS in response to a trauma-memory script
that Reinders et al. [39,40] documented, might be due to fantasy
proneness, suggestion and role-playing, and that they do not prove
a traumagenic origin of DID. Obtaining independent proof of
childhood traumatization in adulthood is most difficult. However,
the claim that the previously reported results constitute effects of
fantasy proneness, suggestion, and role-playing is open to test.
Thus, the present study involves a psychobiological comparison
between NIS and TIS engaging in active kinds of physical defence
in DID patients (i.e., the DID identity states from Reinders et al.
[39,40]), and simulated NIS and TIS in high and low fantasy
prone mentally healthy women who do not report a trauma
history and who are instructed and motivated to role-play these
different identity states (i.e., simulated identity states).
The a priori hypotheses of the current study were: (i) important
previously found psychophysiological and neurobiological differ-
ences between NIS and TIS engaging in active kinds of physical
defence in DID patients [39,40] are upheld when controlling for
fantasy proneness, suggestion, and instructed and motivated role-
playing, and (ii) the upheld psychophysiological and neurobiolog-
ical differences for NIS and TIS in DID patients include higher
sympathetic nervous system activation (e.g. higher heart rate and
systolic bloodpressure) and subcortical activity (e.g. the amygdala
and caudate nucleus) for TIS in DID, and (iii) hyperactivation of
the cortical multimodal posterior association areas (e.g. the
intraparietal sulcus and (pre-)cuneus) for NIS in DID when
listening to personal trauma scripts.
Results
Twenty-nine subjects participated in the brain imaging study:
11 patients with dissociative identity disorder (DID), 10 high
fantasy prone DID simulating controls, and 8 low fantasy prone
DID simulating controls. The controls were instructed to enact the
two DID identity states: a neutral identity state (NIS) and a
trauma-related identity state (TIS). Brain imaging data, autonomic
(systolic and diastolic blood pressure, discrete heart rate and heart
rate variability (HRV)) and subjective (controls’ subjective
sensorimotor and emotional experiences) reactions were obtained.
DID patients, as well as high fantasy prone and low fantasy prone
controls were studied in the two different types of identity states
during a memory script (MS) driven (neutral or trauma-related
autobiographical texts) imagery paradigm. The brain imaging data
of the three groups was statistically analyzed in SPM5 in a three-
by-two-by-two factorial design which allows for the assessment of
various effects, e.g., main effects and simple subtraction analyses
(within and between identity state) within and between the three
groups.
Autonomic and Subjective Reactions
Statistical results of the autonomic and subjective reactions
analyses between the three groups are presented in Table 1. Mean
values and the direction of the responses are depicted in Figure 1.
Significant differences were found for most of the measured
variables between the DID patients and both control groups (see
for details Table 1) for dissociative identity state (DIS), DIS*group,
MS, MS*group, DIS*MS, and DIS*MS*group.
Regional Cerebral Blood Flow Changes
Covariate data. T-tests were used to test if a significant
(p,0.05) difference in regional cerebral bloodflow (rCBF) variance
between the DID and control groups was explained by the
subjective or objective covariates (i.e. the principal components
(PC), see below). No brain areas for which a significant difference
was present between the DID patients and the high or low fantasy
prone controls respectively were found.
Comparing Simulated and Pathological Identity States
Main effects and conjunction analyses. Results for the
within DID group re-analyses and for the two between group
comparisons of the dissociative identity states (DIS) main effects,
both TIS and NIS, are given in Table 2. Significant differences in
rCBF changes between the DID and both the high and low fantasy
prone groups were found, i.e., text independent effects. These
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between patients and controls were found (data not shown).
Trauma-related MS effects within identity
state. Trauma-related MS effects within both TIS and NIS
are given in Table 3. TIS showed significant regionally specific
increases and decreases in cerebral blood flow, when processing
the trauma-related MS as compared to the neutral MS, between
the DID and both the high and low fantasy prone control groups.
These findings are depicted in Figure 3 and 4.
Trauma-related MS effects between identity
state. Trauma-related MS effects between DIS are given in
Table 4. Different rCBF patterns were found for NIS and TIS,
when processing the trauma-related MS, between the DID and
both the high and low fantasy prone control groups. These
differential rCBF patterns are shown in Figure 5 and 6. The results
indicate that, for some areas (e.g. the parahippocampal gyrus in
the comparison NISt-TISt or the caudate nucleus in the
comparison TISt-NISt), the difference in blood flow between
patients and controls is larger than the difference between the DID
identity states.
Discussion
The present study was performed to examine whether earlier
reported results [39,40] for DID hold after correcting for potential
iatrogenic and other sociogenic effects. To this end, we tested
whether these findings can be simulated by motivated role-
enactment and/or is facilitated by a high level of fantasy proneness
[18] by re-investigating the patient population from Reinders et al.
[39,40]. Results of a sub-study (see Methods and Supporting
Information S1) show that DID patients have a fantasy proneness
score of 9.83 (SD 5.25), which approximates the normal
population, indicating that fantasy proneness might not play a
major role in DID. This finding is consistent with the current
psychobiological results. Neither high nor low fantasy prone
healthy controls, instructed and motivated to simulate two
different types of dissociative identity states in DID (i.e., NIS
and TIS), mimicked previously observed psychophysiological and
neural reactions that are associated with these identity states in
DID [39,40], which is supportive of our first a priori hypothesis.
From results shown in Figures 2, 3, and 5 a general feel of the
effects can be obtained. Figures 2 and 5 and the top row of Figure 3
show that in the high fantasy prone control group more of the
original DID rCBF patterns are apparent, while the low fantasy
prone control group show less similarities with the original DID
rCBF patterns, for example the disappearance of the left amygdala
activation. Less similarities between patients only and patients
versus controls means more overlap in rCBF patterns. In other
words the less differences in the rCBF patterns between patients
only and patients versus controls, the better the controls simulate
DID. Thus, relatively speaking, low fantasy prone controls
simulated the performance of DID patients better than high
fantasy prone controls. This result is the opposite from the
direction indicated by holders of the sociocognitive and fantasy
based model of DID [17,19–21,46]. As patients and controls were
scanned in a highly similar experimental setting and because
controls were highly motivated to simulate DID, commonalities in
brain activation between patients and controls were expected.
Despite the overlap in brain activation between patients and
controls important previously found psychophysiological and
neurobiological differences between NIS and TIS in DID patients
were upheld when controlling for fantasy proneness, suggestion,
and instructed and motivated role-playing, which is supportive of
our first a priori hypothesis.
The activated areas seem to be subdivided in two distinct neural
networks, where the NIS activates areas in the cerebral cortex,
Table 1. Between group: Subjective and autonomic reactions.
Between group: DID versus CH Between group: DID versus CL
DIS
DIS*
Group MS
MS*
Group
DIS *
MS
DIS*MS*
Group DIS
DIS*
Group MS
MS*
Group
DIS *
MS
DIS*MS*
Group
Subjective ratings
sensory rating ,0.001** ,0.001** ,0.001** ,0.001** ,0.001** ,0.001** ,0.001** ,0.007** ,0.001** ,0.001** ,0.001** 0.001**
emotional rating ,0.001** n.s. ,0.001** 0.001** ,0.001** 0.031* ,0.001** 0.076 ,0.001** ,0.001** ,0.001** 0.030*
Autonomic reactions
heart rate frequency 0.011* 0.002** ,0.001** ,0.001** 0.009* 0.036* 0.018* 0.010* ,0.001** ,0.001** 0.021* 0.023*
systolic blood pressure 0.058 0.015* 0.006** 0.005** 0.044* 0.018* 0.080 0.034* 0.006** 0.025* 0.017* n.s.
diastolic blood pressure 0.043* n.s. 0.001** 0.002** n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.001** 0.004** n.s. n.s.
HRV-AVG n.s. 0.078 0.006** 0.003** 0.017* 0.036* n.s. n.s. 0.009* 0.015* 0.054 0.033*
Factorial statistical analyses of the between group (DID versus high or low fantasy prone DID simulating healthy controls, respectively) subjective reactions (emotional
and sensori-motor ratings) and autonomic (discrete heart rate, systolic and diastolic blood pressure and heart rate variability) measurements. The statistical analyses
consist of the two main effects and the accompanying interaction effect. Statistical values are reported in p values.
**= p,0.0083 (i.e., corrected for multiple comparisons).
*= p,0.05 (i.e., uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
DID = dissociative identity disorder.
CH = high fantasy prone DID simulating controls.
CL = low fantasy prone DID simulating controls.
DIS = dissociative identity state.
DIS*Group = interaction effect.
MS = memory script.
MS*Group = interaction effect.
DIS * MS = interaction effect.
DIS*MS*Group = interaction effect.
HRV-AVG = average of normal-to-normal time intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039279.t001
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and Figure 2). The Tables show a detailed listing of all the brain
areas involved. The brain areas marked with a
II in the Tables are
brain areas non-specific to DID as they disappear after comparing
to a control group, i.e. these areas share commonalities between
patients and controls. The brain areas marked with a
III and
IV in
the Tables are brain areas specific to DID. The areas in the latter
group are areas that were not reported earlier as they were
‘‘subtracted out’’ in the within group comparisons.
Our findings support the cortico-limbic inhibition model of
trauma-related dissociative disorders [41,47]. Results of both the
NISt-TISt comparison and the main effect of NIS show significant
overlap with the activated network of brain regions during
emotional memory suppression of unwanted memories in mentally
healthy individuals [48], for example in frontal areas (BA 4/6/8/
10/47), cingulate cortex (BA 32), and intraparietal sulcus (BA 7/
40). Anderson et al. [48] did not find all of these brain areas. There
is significant overlap between our study and their study, but the
brain areas involved in the modulation of access to trauma-related
memory in our patient population are of larger number. This
might be an indication that, when functioning as NIS, in DID
patients different cortical processes are involved that modulate
conscious and subconscious perception of trauma-related infor-
mation. These areas, e.g. (pre-)cuneus (BA 7/39, 18/19), fusiform
gyrus (BA 18/19/37), lingual gyrus (BA 18), occipital gyrus (BA
18/19/37), and the parahippocampal gyrus (BA 35/36), are
located in the posterior association areas (PAA) and have been
indicated to be involved in multimodal [49,50] somato-sensory
integration [51,52] of information, especially in relation to
attention and perceptual awareness [49]. Hyperactivation of
cortical multimodal association areas for NIS in DID when
listening to personal trauma scripts constituted our third a priori
hypothesis. We thus propose that for emotional memory
suppression, or NIS’ mental avoidance [41], of unwanted
memories in DID the PAA fulfils a pivotal role.
There are notable similarities in the patterns of brain activation
for DID patients, as revealed in the main effect TIS and the TISt-
NISt comparison, and mentally healthy individuals unsuppressed
memory retrieval [48]. Both groups had increased activation of the
insula (BA 13) and parietal operculum (BA 40/43). We did not
find the hippocampus to play a role in memory retrieval in DID
patients, despite the fact that this area has been indicated in
memory processing in mentally healthy individuals [48]. Instead
we found that the caudate nucleus was activated when DID
patients listened to the trauma-memory scripts as TIS. Acute stress
can be associated with a shift from hippocampal involvement to
caudate nucleus involvement [53,54]. Thus, acute stress is linked
with caudate nucleus-dependent stimulus-response type reactivity
at the expense of hippocampal dependent spatial learning and
memory [53]. According to the theory of structural dissociation
[33,41] listening to a description of a personal traumatic memory
in an experimental setting constitutes a consciously experienced
acute stressor for TIS, because as this dissociative identity state
DID patients do not manage to mentally avoid the relevant
memory. When DID patients as TIS are confronted with
reminders of traumatic memories, they may initiate a caudate
Figure 1. Graphical representation of averages and direction of subjective emotional experiences, subjective sensori-motor
experiences, and cardiovascular responses. The dashed line depicts the response of the neutral identity state (NIS) when listening to the
neutral or trauma-related memory script (MS). The solid line depicts the response of the traumatic identity state (TIS) when listening to the neutral or
trauma related MS. All three groups are presented per variable: the dissociative identity disorder patients (DID) in pink, the high fantasy prone DID
simulating controls (CH) in cyan and the low fantasy prone DID simulating controls (CL) in blue. See Table 1 for the statistical values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039279.g001
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Within group Between group
DID only DID - CH DID - CL
L/R Brain region
I = a priori B A xyzT k ExyzT k ExyzT k E
Main Effect TIS
Cortical areas
L Insula BA 13
IIIb 246 220 14 4.76 258
1 246 224 18 4.41** 302
1
R Insula BA 13
IIIb 32 224 18 3.87 42
2 46 22 22 3.98** 1201
3
L Orbitofrontal cortex BA 11
IV 230 34 222 3.95 96
BA 11
IV 224 56 220 3.73 61
L Parietal operculum
I BA 40
IIIb 254 214 16 4.02 258
2 254 214 16 3.45* 302
2
R Parietal operculum
I BA 40/43
II 52 2 20 3.97 64
1
BA 40/43
II 48 26 26 3.52 64
2
R Postcentral gyrus
I BA 43
III 68 214 14 4.60 177
1 68 -10 16 4.25* 94
1 68 214 18 4.65** 146
1
R Precentral gyrus
I BA 6
IIIb 66 6 20 4.06 177
2 66 8 20 3.57** 146
2
L S. Temporal gyrus BA 22/42
IV 268 228 18 3.63** 64
1
BA 22/42
IV 260 234 16 3.20 64
2
R S. Temporal gyrus BA 22/42
IV 70 222 16 3.27 94
2
BA 22/42
IV 72 240 10 3.52 17
Subcortical areas
L Amygdala
I IIIa 26 26 226 4.30 29 26 26 226 3.73* 35
L Caudate nucleus (anterior part)
IV 224 14 18 3.53** 338
3
R Caudate nucleus (caudal part)
II I 20 226 20 4.56 42
1
L Caudate nucleus (dorsal part)
I III 226 210 20 4.72 203
2 224 24 20 3.88* 144
2 222 26 20 4.90** 338
1
III 218 24 20 4.98 203
1 212 2 18 3.96* 144
1 214 4 18 4.76** 338
2
R Caudate nucleus (dorsal part)
I III 22 2 22 4.69 229
1 24 4 20 4.84* 625
1 26 24 16 5.73** 1201
1
IV 24 24 18 4.71* 625
2
R Caudate nucleus
(lateral-dorsal part)
I
IIIb 32 22 22 4.05 229
2 32 6 20 4.74** 1201
2
L Caudate nucleus (tail)
II I 226 236 12 4.45 43
R Putamen
II V 26 216 16 3.90* 625
3
Cerebellum
L Cerebellar Tonsil (nodule)
I IIIa 26 244 234 4.73 88 26 246 234 3.60* 29
R Nucleus Dentatus
II V 12 248 230 3.48* 10
Main Effect NIS
Cortical areas
R Angular gyrus BA 39
IIIa 42 272 34 4.16** 508
2 44 262 30 3.66 238
2
BA 39
IV 50 266 34 3.41 238
3
R Anterior Cingulate gyrus
I BA 32
II 2 46 6 4.94** 1039
1
R Cingulate gyrus
I BA 32
IIIa 2 18 42 4.93** 2140
3 485 0 3 . 2 4 1 0
BA 32
IV 8 1 63 43 . 4 4 * 1 8
L Cingulate sulcus BA 31
II 214 240 40 3.91** 419
3
R Cingulate sulcus
I,u BA 6/24
IIIb 16 212 44 5.38** 2140
2 18 212 46 3.33 10
L Cuneus
I BA 18/19
IIIa 216 -88 32 3.82** 292
3 216 -88 32 3.79* 577
2
BA 18/19
IIIa 210 278 20 3.91** 292
2 210 278 20 3.61* 577
3
R Cuneus
I BA 18/19
IIIa 14 278 34 3.87** 102
2 12 280 22 3.75* 184
1
BA 18/19
IV 16 290 38 3.62* 184
2
X Cuneus BA 18
II 0 290 40 3.77** 13
R Fusiform gyrus
I BA 19
II 42 264 220 5.00** 259
1
BA 19/37
II 28 258 214 3.60** 259
2
L I. Frontal gyrus BA 47
IV 242 28 212 3.67 42
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Within group Between group
DID only DID - CH DID - CL
L/R Brain region
I = a priori B A xyzT k ExyzT k ExyzT k E
R I. Frontal gyrus BA 45/47
II 46 32 2 3.58** 11
L Medial Frontal gyrus BA 10
IV 24 66 2 3.38 41
L M. Frontal gyrus BA 10
II 220 66 8 3.52** 9
R S./Medial Frontal gyrus BA 10
IIIb 12 64 4 4.94** 1039
2 14 64 4 3.27 11
BA 10
II 12 66 12 4.75** 1039
3
R S. Frontal gyrus
I BA 8
IIIb 12 38 56 4.81** 156
1 12 36 58 3.51 9
BA 6
II 14 26 66 3.38** 156
2
L S. Frontal sulcus
I BA 6
IIIb 232 22 48 5.47** 2140
1 234 24 50 3.60* 66
1
BA 6
IV 240 4 52 3.36* 66
2
R S. Frontal sulcus
I BA 4/6
IV 26 214 52 3.27* 26
2
BA 4/6
IV 28 216 44 3.61* 26
1
L Lingual gyrus BA 18
IV 210 282 210 3.23 64
2
BA 18
IV 28 290 210 3.50 64
1
R Lingual gyrus
I BA 18
III 16 282 214 4.31** 286
1 14 280 28 3.60 35 14 276 212 3.44* 32
BA 18
II 20 272 218 3.67** 286
2
BA 18
II 22 274 28 3.58** 286
3
L M. Occipital gyrus
I BA 18
II 228 288 14 4.15** 79
1
BA 18
II 224 298 16 3.74** 79
2
L S. Occipital gyrus/Angular gyrus
I BA 19/39
III 238 280 28 6.12** 299 242 280 32 3.68* 51 240 -80 32 4.03* 89
R S. Occipital sulcus
I BA 19
II 30 286 32 3.87** 508
3
S. Occipital sulcus
I/Cuneus
I BA 18/19
II 18 288 40 4.03** 102
1
R Occipitotemporal sulcus
I BA 20/37
III 48 240 212 4.66** 311
1 48 240 212 4.68* 187
1 44 236 212 4.43** 134
BA 20/37
IV 46 -52 -6 3.74* 187
2
L Parahippocampal gyrus
I BA 35
IV 238 244 -8 4.41** 142
1
BA 35
IV 238 242 216 3.57* 142
2
BA 35
IV 226 222 214 3.34 10
BA 35
IIIb 214 246 22 3.49** 191
2 28 238 210 5.06** 426
R Parahippocampal gyrus
I BA 35/36
II 22 244 22 4.26** 185
1
BA 35/36
II 24 234 26 4.10** 185
3
BA 35/36
II 28 242 28 4.16** 185
2
L Intra-Parietal sulcus
I BA 7/40
IIIa 234 250 36 4.59** 419
2 234 248 36 3.90* 95
BA 7/40
II 226 248 40 5.50** 419
1
R Intra-Parietal sulcus
I BA 7/40
IIIa 24 238 44 5.53** 390
1 24 -40 44 4.80* 316
1
BA 7/40
IIIa 38 232 34 3.69** 390
2 34 -36 38 3.88* 316
2
BA 7/40
IV 34 -28 40 3.37* 316
3
L Rostral I. Parietal Lobule
I,v BA 40
II 258 244 42 4.38** 87
R S. Parietal lobule
I/Precuneus
I BA 7
IIIa 26 264 34 5.77** 508
1 24 264 36 4.01* 238
1
L Precuneus
I BA 7/31
IIIa 24 262 32 3.96** 292
1 28 266 30 4.03* 577
1
R Precuneus BA 31
IIIa 12 262 14 3.48** 9 12 -62 18 3.46 61
1
BA 31
IV 16 -58 12 3.36 61
2
R Rectal gyrus BA 11
IV 22 8 214 4.10** 126
L M. Temporal gyrus BA 21
IV 252 224 28 4.14** 124
R M. Temporal gyrus
I BA 21
IIIa 54 226 212 4.62** 311
2 54 226 212 3.40* 187
3
BA 21
II 62 28 212 4.25** 311
3
Sub-cortical areas
L Caudatus nucleus (head)
I IIIb 26 6 0 4.43** 66 284 22 3.39* 13
R Lateral Globus Pallidus
I IIIb 16 4 22 3.51** 160
3 16 6 22 3.47* 118
2
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reaction is also supported by an accompanying amygdala
activation [44,57]. Another, but compatible, explanation for
increased caudate and amygdala activation in DID patients as
compared to controls is a heightened memory sensitivity for
negative valanced information [58]. These findings for TIS are
supportive of our second a priori hypothesis.
To date, experimental research of inter-identity amnesia in DID
has produced mixed results. One study [59] demonstrated
evidence for inter-identity amnesia, which is in line with the
Table 2. Cont.
Within group Between group
DID only DID - CH DID - CL
L/R Brain region
I = a priori B A xyzT k ExyzT k ExyzT k E
IV 20 -6 26 3.57* 118
1
IIIb 24 0 22 4.25** 160
1 24 0 22 3.36* 118
3
R Substania Nigra
IV 8 218 210 3.45 16
R Thalamus
II I 8 28 0 4.19** 160
2
Cerebellum
L Cerebellum (anterior lobe)
II I 24 240 212 4.84** 191
1
Overview of brain areas with statistically significant cerebral blood flow changes when comparing DID patients to high or low DID simulating controls (CH and CL
respectively) for the dissociative identity state main effects.
DID = dissociative identity disorder patient group.
CH = high fantasy prone DID simulating control group.
CL = low fantasy prone DID simulating control group.
I= A priori brain areas based on Reinders et al. (2006) [40].
II= Brain areas found only in the DID within group analysis.
III= Brain areas found in the DID within group analysis, in the DID versus CH between group analysis and in the DID versus CL between group analysis.
IIIa= Brain areas found in the DID within group analysis and in the DID versus CH between group analysis.
IIIb= Brain areas found in the DID within group analysis and in the DID versus CL between group analysis.
IV= Brain areas not found in the DID within group analysis but appears in the between group analysis DID versus CH or DID versus CL.
1= first peak voxel in the cluster of the specified size.
2= second peak voxel in the cluster of the specified size.
3= third peak voxel in the cluster of the specified size.
**= whole brain multiple comparison correction (p,0.05) using false discovery rate statistics [85].
*= region of interest multiple comparison correction (p,0.05) using false discovery rate statistics [85].
u= Callosomarginal sulcus (SCM) (= Cingulate sulcus).
v= Supramarginal gyrus (Rostral I. Parietal Lobule).
(x, y, z) = MNI coordinates in mm.
L/R = Left/Right.
kE = clustersize in voxels (one voxel is 26262 mm).
NIS = neutral identity state.
TIS = trauma-related identity state.
BA = Brodmann area.
I. = inferior; M. = middle; S. = superior.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039279.t002
Figure 2. ‘‘Glass brain’’ renderings showing the dissociative identity state main effects, both for the trauma-related identity state
(TIS) and for the neutral identity state (NIS), for the dissociative identity disorder (DID) group (left) and the comparison of this
group to the high (middle) and low (right) fantasy prone DID simulating controls (CH and CL respectively). See Table 2 for the specific
areas.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039279.g002
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Within group Between group
DID only DID - CH DID - CL
L/R Brain Region
I = a priori BA x y z T kE x y z T kE x y z T kE
TISt - TISn
Cortical areas
L Insula
I BA 13
II 246 220 14 5.32 569
1
BA 13
III 238 214 14 4.36 569
2 238 214 14 3.61* 48
1 238 214 14 4.61* 327
1
L Parietal operculum
I BA 40
IIIb 248 230 12 4.02 569
3 250 222 12 3.39* 327
2
R Postcentral gyrus BA 43
IV 68 214 18 3.58 19
R I. Temporal gyrus BA 20
IV 32 212 244 3.57 9
L S. Temporal gyrus BA 42
IV 268 228 14 3.51 95
2
BA 22
IV 258 240 12 3.73 95
1
Sub-cortical areas
L Amygdala
I IIIa 210 26 224 4.18 63 212 24 226 4.05* 132
L Caudate nucleus (dorsal part)
II V 212 4 16 4.13* 39
R Caudate nucleus (dorsal part)
I III 22 0 22 4.05 28 24 22 14 3.64* 53
1 26 2 20 3.76* 56
R Caudate nucleus
(lateral-dorsal part)
I
IV 28 6 14 3.18* 53
2
L Caudate nucleus (tail)
I IIIa 224 234 16 4.36 20 222 224 16 3.60* 13
R Caudate nucleus (tail)
II 36 238 10 3.80 24
L Putamen
IV 224 218 14 3.30 48
2 224 218 14 3.22 327
3
Cerebellum
L Cerebellar Tonsil (nodule)
II I 26 242 234 4.07 34
TISn - TISt
Cortical areas
R Angular gyrus BA 39
IV 48 274 32 3.30 11
L Anterior Cingulate gyrus BA 32
II 22 44 8 3.61 14
L Posterior Cingulate gyrus
I BA 31
II 28 238 46 3.78 11
R Cingulate sulcus
I,u BA 6/24
IIIb 20 210 52 4.02 116
1 20 210 52 3.76* 101
BA 6/24
II 14 212 46 3.90 116
2
L Cuneus
I BA 18/19
IIIa 210 278 24 3.81 177
2 210 278 24 3.39* 210
2
R Cuneus BA 18/19
II 16 284 28 3.41 64
3
R I. Frontal gyrus BA 44
II 56 10 2 3.69 18
R Fusiform gyrus
I BA 19/37
IIIb 26 256 214 4.11 345
2 26 258 218 3.77* 478
3
BA 18
IV 26 296 220 3.48 38
2
BA 19/37
IIIb 36 256 220 3.80 345
3 34 258 220 4.11 478
1
BA 19/37
II 38 266 224 4.65 345
1
L Lingual gyrus BA 18
IV 214 288 214 3.73 139
1
BA 18
IV 210 282 210 3.23 139
2
R Lingual gyrus BA 18
IV 22 272 222 4.09 478
2
BA 18
IV 24 2100 210 3.65 38
1
L S. Occipital gyrus
I/Angular gyrus BA 19/39
IIIb 240 280 26 4.19 39 242 280 28 3.59 29
R S. Occipital gyrus
I BA 19
II 30 284 30 3.96 26
R S. Occipital sulcus
I/Cuneus
I BA 18/19
II 18 290 38 3.86 64
1
R Occipitotemporal sulcus
I BA 20/37
III 48 234 216 3.96 34
1 48 238 212 3.65 23 46 236 214 4.31* 89
L Parahippocampal gyrus BA 35/36
IV 224 234 214 3.61 23
L Intra-Parietal sulcus
I BA 7/40
II 238 252 32 3.99 27
BA 7/40
II 222 248 34 3.81 14
R Intra-Parietal sulcus
I BA 7/40
II 28 238 44 4.54 110
1
BA 7/40
III 38 236 36 3.37 110
2 34 236 36 3.72* 62 34 234 38 4.13* 122
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transfer of newly learned non-autobiographical stimuli, even
though the ‘‘amnestic’’ identity reported subjective amnesia for
these stimuli. Several principles might explain the inconsistent
findings: (i) Inter-identity amnesia may only exist for stimuli that
have personal relevance for the ‘‘amnestic’’ identity. In the cited
studies [59–65], it was not assessed if or to what degree the applied
stimuli had autobiographical meaning for the tested ‘‘amnestic’’
and ‘‘mnestic’’ dissociative identities. Our study included trau-
matic memories that were subjectively autobiographical for TIS
but not for NIS, and found that NIS and TIS had different
subjective, psychophysiological, and neural reactions to a descrip-
tion of the involved traumatic memories. We also found that as a
NIS, DID patients did not relate these traumatic memories to
themselves [39]. These results indicate the importance of using
autobiographical information when investigating inter-identity
amnesia in DID. (ii) Inter-identity amnesia may predominantly
exist between different types of dissociative identities, particularly
between neural and trauma-related identity states.This has been
clinically observed, theoretically proposed [33,41] and is in line
with our results. Unfortunately, in most studies [59–66] it was not
assessed what types of dissociative identities participated, e.g. NIS
or TIS. Therefore, we strongly recommend that in future research
in DID the types of dissociative identities are verified and reported
and that test material is used that is subjectively autobiographical
for one dissociative identity, but not for another.
The sociocognitive view of DID entails the idea that this
disorder can be easily and readily created in motivated suggestible
individuals and that few suggestions would suffice to generate the
symptoms of DID [15] (see Supporting Information S2). Still, one
might argue that the current brief practice of DID simulation is
insufficient to simulate the psychobiological profiles of NIS and
TIS. Even if years of practice could generate these profiles, our
findings suggest that fantasy proneness is not the driving factor
because low fantasy prone controls simulated the performance of
DID patients better than high fantasy prone controls. This result is
the opposite from the direction indicated by holders of the
sociocognitive and fantasy based view. Therefore we feel that our
Table 3. Cont.
Within group Between group
DID only DID - CH DID - CL
L/R Brain Region
I = a priori BA x y z T kE x y z T kE x y z T kE
L Rostral I. Parietal Lobule
I,v BA 40
II 260 244 40 3.77 19
R S. Parietal Lobule/Precuneus
I BA 7
IIIb 24 264 36 4.32 65 28 266 32 3.49* 34
L Precentral sulcus
I BA 4/6
II 230 28 52 3.85 43
L Precuneus
I BA 7/31
III 216 268 28 4.22 177
1 212 266 26 4.25* 210
1 216 268 28 4.26* 181
BA 7/31
II 210 264 32 3.74 177
3
R (Pre-)Cuneus/Parieto-occipital sulcusBA 7/19
II 18 278 34 3.79 64
2
R M. Temporal gyrus
I BA 21
II 54 226 212 3.58 34
2
BA 21
IIIa 62 26 214 4.24 48 60 22 216 3.33 11
Cerebellum
L Cerebellum (anterior lobe)
IIIb 24 242 214 3.79 11 24 244 214 3.62 48
1
IV 24 236 212 3.43 48
2
Overview of brain areas with statistically significant cerebral blood flow changes when comparing DID patients to high or low DID simulating controls (CH and CL
respectively) for the trauma-related memory script effects within dissociative identity state.
DID = dissociative identity disorder patient group.
CH = high fantasy prone DID simulating control group.
CL = low fantasy prone DID simulating control group.
I= A priori brain areas based on Reinders et al. (2006) [40].
II= Brain areas found only in the DID within group analysis.
III= Brain areas found in the DID within group analysis, in the DID versus CH between group analysis and in the DID versus CL between group analysis.
IIIa= Brain areas found in the DID within group analysis and in the DID versus CH between group analysis.
IIIb= Brain areas found in the DID within group analysis and in the DID versus CL between group analysis.
IV= Brain areas not found in the DID within group analysis but appear in the between group analysis DID versus CH or DID versus CL.
1= first peak voxel in the cluster of the specified size.
2= second peak voxel in the cluster of the specified size.
3= third peak voxel in the cluster of the specified size.
**= whole brain multiple comparison correction (p,0.05) using false discovery rate statistics [85].
*= region of interest multiple comparison correction (p,0.05) using false discovery rate statistics [85].
u= Callosomarginal sulcus (SCM) (= Cingulate sulcus).
v= Supramarginal gyrus (Rostral I. Parietal Lobule).
(x, y, z) = MNI coordinates in mm.
L/R = Left/Right.
kE = clustersize in voxels (one voxel is 26262 mm).
NISn = neutral identity state exposed to the neutral memory script.
NISt = neutral identity state exposed to the trauma-related memory script.
TISn = trauma-related identity state exposed to the neutral memory script.
TISt = trauma-related identity state exposed to the trauma-related memory script.
BA = Brodmann area.
I. = inferior; M. = middle; S. = superior.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039279.t003
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sion.
For the first time, it is shown using brain imaging that neither
high nor low fantasy prone healthy women, who enacted two
different types of dissociative identity states, were able to
substantially simulate these identity states in psychobiological
terms. These results do not support the idea of a sociogenic origin
for DID.
Methods
Participants
Controls. Mentally healthy females were recruited by local
newspaper advertisements. Respondents were sent a letter in
which the study was explained and in which they were invited to
complete three questionnaires: (i) the Traumatic Experiences
Checklist (TEC) [67], a self-report questionnaire assessing
potentially traumatizing events such as physical abuse and
emotional neglect, (ii) the Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire
(SDQ-20 [68–70], a self-report questionnaire evaluating the
severity of somatoform dissociative symptoms, e.g., analgesia,
anesthesia, motor inhibitions), and (iii) the Creative Experiences
Questionnaire (CEQ) [18] which measures fantasy proneness.
Exclusion criteria were the presence of medical, neurological or
psychiatric problems in the past or the present, the use of
psychotropic medication 15 days prior to examination, participa-
tion in a positron emission tomography (PET) or other study that
involved administration of radiation in the year prior to this study,
Figure 3. ‘‘Glass brain’’ renderings show differences in the processing of the trauma-related text (indicated with a small ‘t’) and the
neutral text (indicated with a small ‘n’) within the trauma-related identity state (TIS). Differences in regional cerebral blood flow patterns
for the dissociative identity disorder (DID) group (left) and the comparison of this group to the high (middle) and low (right) fantasy prone DID
simulating controls (CH and CL respectively) are depicted. See Table 3 for the specific areas.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039279.g003
Figure 4. The brain areas indicated with the blue cross (i.e. the peak voxel) are (from top left to bottom right): the left amygdala,
the left insula, the left precuneus, and the right occipitotemporal sulcus. These areas have the most significant rCBF differences between
the dissociative identity disorder patients and high and low fantasy prone DID simulating controls (CH and CL respectively) and is shown both in
directionality, i.e. the bar graphs, and location, i.e. shown on a coronal overlay (left in the picture is left in the brain). Results show the differential
processing of the trauma-related text versus the neutral text within the TIS, when comparing the DID groups to the high fantasy prone control group
(left) and low fantasy prone control group (right).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039279.g004
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Within group Between group
DID only DID - CH DID - CL
L/R Brain region
I = a priori B A xyzT k E xyzT k E xyzT k E
TISt-NISt
Cortical areas
LI n s u l a
I BA 13
IIIb 246 220 14 5.32 367
1 242 220 16 4.10** 568
2
BA 13
II 234 216 16 3.65 367
2
RI n s u l a B A 1 3
IV 42 26 26 3.26 37
2
BA 13
IV 46 212 26 3.41 16
L Orbitofrontal cortex BA 11
IV 232 36 222 3.58 21
R Parietal operculum BA 40/43
IV 48 22 22 3.40 37
1
R Postcentral gyrus
I BA 43
III 68 214 14 3.83 23 68 214 14 3.44 12 68 214 18 4.45** 106
R Precentral gyrus BA 6
IV 66 8 20 3.87 41
L S. Temporal gyrus BA 22/42
IV 268 228 14 3.81 92
1
BA 22
IV 258 240 14 3.45 92
2
Sub-cortical areas
L Amygdala
II V 216 212 232 3.34* 129
2
IIIa 26 26 226 4.06 24 26 26 226 3.75* 129
1
R Caudate nucleus (caudal part)
I IIIa 20 226 20 4.01 10 20 224 18 3.75* 352
3
L Caudate nucleus (dorsal part)
I III 226 210 20 4.07 78
1 226 210 20 3.49* 29
2 226 24 20 4.02** 568
3
III 212 2 18 4.04 78
2 212 2 18 3.90* 34 212 4 16 4.71** 568
1
R Caudate nucleus (dorsal part)
II V 24 22 14 4.38* 352
1 26 0 18 5.09** 490
1
IIIa 22 2 22 4.29 61 24 4 20 4.37* 352
2
L Caudate nucleus (tail)
II I 224 234 16 4.12 19
L Putamen
IV 224 218 14 3.55 29
1
R Putamen
IV 26 214 16 3.66 490
2
Cerebellum
L Cerebellar Tonsil (nodule)
II V 28 256 234 3.25* 47
2
IIIa 26 244 234 4.81 84 26 246 234 3.63 47
1
L Cerebellum (lateral part)
II I 256 248 232 4.03 24
1
II 254 248 242 3.41 24
2
NISt-TISt
Cortical areas
R Angular gyrus BA 39
III 48 264 32 4.03** 597
2 44 262 30 3.80 135
1 46 262 34 3.34 11
BA 39
IV 50 266 34 3.44 135
2
L Anterior Cingulate gyrus BA 32
II 22 38 10 3.62** 142
2
BA 32
II 24 54 10 3.34** 142
3
X Anterior Cingulate gyrus
I BA 32
II 0 46 6 4.21** 142
1
L Cingulate gyrus
I BA 24
II 210 212 38 3.96** 40
R Cingulate gyrus
I BA 32
IIIa 2 18 42 4.64** 376
1 8 14 36 3.74* 89
1
BA 32
IIIa 6 8 48 3.80** 376
3 4 8 50 3.28* 89
2
L Cingulate sulcus/
Cingulate gyrus
I
BA 24/32
II 216 12 44 4.10** 376
2
R Cingulate sulcus
I,u BA 6/24
IIIb 16 212 44 4.91** 614
1 20 210 46 3.53* 72
1
BA 6/24
II 20 210 52 4.51** 614
3
L Posterior Cingulate gyrus BA 31
IV 26 242 40 3.37 14
L Cuneus
I BA 18/19
III 210 278 20 4.57** 620
1 210 278 20 4.08* 921
2 212 272 30 3.64* 92
1
BA 18/19
III 214 272 30 4.17** 620
2 214 276 32 3.92* 921
3 216 290 36 3.56* 20
R Cuneus
I BA 18/19
IIIa 16 284 28 3.83** 212
3 12 280 22 3.86* 252
1
BA 19
IIIa 18 280 36 3.99** 212
2 18 290 38 3.80* 252
2
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Within group Between group
DID only DID - CH DID - CL
L/R Brain region
I = a priori B A xyzT k E xyzT k E xyzT k E
BA 19
IV 18 284 30 3.52* 252
3
X Cuneus BA 18
II 0 290 40 3.61** 19
L I. Frontal gyrus BA 47
IV 242 28 212 3.42 19
R S. Frontal gyrus
I BA 10
II 22 66 16 4.03** 407
2
BA 8
II 12 38 56 4.83** 177
1
BA 6
II 14 26 66 3.40** 177
2
R S./Medial Frontal gyrus
I BA 10
II 12 64 4 4.59** 407
1
RB A 1 0
II 10 64 20 4.02** 407
3
L S. Frontal sulcus
I BA 6
IIIb 232 22 48 5.02** 318 234 22 52 3.64 36
R S. Frontal sulcus
I BA 4/6
IV 26 214 52 3.32* 33
2 24 210 56 3.44* 72
2
BA 4/6
IIIa 28 214 46 4.56** 614
2 28 216 44 3.61* 33
1
L Fusiform gyrus BA 19
IV 228 268 210 3.47 28
R Fusiform gyrus
I BA 18
IV 26 296 220 3.34* 34
1
BA 19/37
II 26 256 214 4.10** 149
1
BA 19
II 40 278 222 3.38** 185
2
BA 19/37
IIIb 42 264 220 4.79** 185
1 38 262 220 3.79** 482
2
L Lingual gyrus BA 18
IV 210 284 214 3.88** 616
3
BA 18
IV 26 282 26 3.91** 616
2
BA 18
IV 24 290 210 4.33** 616
1
R Lingual gyrus BA 18
IIIb 20 272 214 3.68** 26 18 298 214 3.20 34
2
L M. Occipital gyrus
I BA 18
II 230 292 12 3.99** 364
2
BA 18
II 224 298 16 3.73** 364
3
L S. Occipital gyrus
I/Angular gyrus BA 19/39
III 238 280 28 5.61** 364
1 238 282 30 3.72* 82 242 278 32 4.27** 128
R S. Occipital gyrus BA 19
II 30 284 30 4.02** 597
3
R S. Occipital sulcus
I/Cuneus BA 18/19
II 18 290 38 4.35** 212
1
R Occipitotemporal sulcus
I BA 20/37
III 46 234 214 4.39** 327
2 48 240 212 4.53* 92 46 236 214 5.24** 294
1
L Parahippocampal gyrus
I BA 35
IV 240 246 24 3.75 18 240 246 26 4.73** 780
1
BA 35/36
IIIb 212 242 26 3.59** 70
2 224 234 214 4.02** 780
3
R Parahippocampal gyrus
I BA 36
IV 20 252 2 3.46* 52
1 22 252 0 4.26** 482
1
BA 35/36
IIIb 20 246 22 4.03** 149
2 22 242 26 3.77** 482
3
BA 35/36
II 24 234 26 3.98** 149
3
L Intra-Parietal sulcus
I BA 7/40
IIIa 238 252 32 4.96** 426
2 234 250 34 4.36* 117
BA 7/40
II 222 248 34 5.25** 426
1
BA 7/40
II 222 236 38 4.53** 426
3
R Intra-Parietal sulcus
I BA 7/40
II 28 238 44 5.07** 332
1
BA 7/40
III 34 236 38 4.15** 332
2 30 238 40 4.36* 249 34 234 38 3.52 30
L Rostral I. Parietal lobule
I,v BA 40
II 258 244 42 4.00** 52
R S. Parietal lobule/Precuneus
I BA 7
III 26 264 32 5.61** 597
1 24 264 30 3.95* 108 24 264 36 3.80** 48
L Precuneus
I BA 7/31
III 26 262 30 3.85** 620
3 28 266 26 4.72 921
1 210 264 32 3.53* 92
2
R Precuneus BA 31
IV 14 264 16 3.25 52
3
BA 31
IV 16 254 12 3.42 52
2
X Rectal gyrus BA 11
IV 02 8 212 3.82** 85
L M. Temporal gyrus BA 21
IV 254 224 210 3.71** 63
R M. Temporal gyrus
I BA 21
III 62 26 214 4.80** 327
1 62 26 214 3.64 15 62 26 214 4.16** 120
BA 21
IIIb 54 226 212 4.24** 327
3 54 224 210 3.66** 294
2
Sub-cortical areas
L Caudatus nucleus (head)
II I 268 22 3.94** 15
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 12 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e39279and pregnancy. A total of 18 healthy controls participated in the
study, which was approved by the Medical Ethical Committee of
the University Medical Center Groningen.
After inclusion, written and oral information on dissociative
identity states (i.e. NIS and TIS) in DID and instructions on how
to simulate these dissociative identity states was given to the
controls. It was checked whether the controls understood this
Table 4. Cont.
Within group Between group
DID only DID - CH DID - CL
L/R Brain region
I = a priori B A xyzT k E xyzT k E xyzT k E
R Lateral Globus Pallidus
II V 24 28 28 3.77** 85
1
IIIb 24 0 22 4.13** 70
1 24 0 22 3.34* 85
2
R Medial Globus Pallidus
II 14 26 22 3.44** 70
2
Cerebellum
L Cerebellum (anterior lobe)
IIIb 26 242 212 4.23** 70
1 24 242 212 4.53** 780
2
Overview of brain areas with statistically significant cerebral blood flow changes when comparing DID patients to high or low DID simulating controls (CH and CL
respectively) for the trauma-related memory script effects between dissociative identity state.
DID = dissociative identity disorder patient group.
CH = high fantasy prone DID simulating control group.
CL = low fantasy prone DID simulating control group.
I= A priori brain areas based on Reinders et al. (2006) [40].
II= Brain areas found only in the DID within group analysis.
III= Brain areas found in the DID within group analysis, in the DID versus CH between group analysis and in the DID versus CL between group analysis.
IIIa= Brain areas found in the DID within group analysis and in the DID versus CH between group analysis.
IIIb= Brain areas found in the DID within group analysis and in the DID versus CL between group analysis.
IV= Brain areas not found in the DID within group analysis but appear in the between group analysis DID versus CH or DID versus CL.
1= first peak voxel in the cluster of the specified size.
2= second peak voxel in the cluster of the specified size.
3= third peak voxel in the cluster of the specified size.
**= whole brain multiple comparison correction (p,0.05) using false discovery rate statistics [85].
*= region of interest multiple comparison correction (p,0.05) using false discovery rate statistics [85].
u= Callosomarginal sulcus (SCM) (= Cingulate sulcus).
v= Supramarginal gyrus (Rostral I. Parietal Lobule).
(x, y, z) = MNI coordinates in mm.
L/R = Left/Right.
kE = clustersize in voxels (one voxel is 26262 mm).
NISn = neutral identity state exposed to the neutral memory script.
NISt = neutral identity state exposed to the trauma-related memory script.
TISn = trauma-related identity state exposed to the neutral memory script.
TISt = trauma-related identity state exposed to the trauma-related memory script.
BA = Brodmann area.
I. = inferior; M. = middle; S. = superior.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039279.t004
Figure 5. ‘‘Glass brain’’ renderings show differences in the processing of the trauma-related text (indicated with a small ‘t’)
between the trauma-related identity state (TIS) and the neutral identity state (NIS). Differences in regional cerebral bloodflow patterns for
the dissociative identity disorder (DID) group (left) and the comparison of this group to the high (middle) and low (right) fantasy prone DID
simulating controls (CH and CL respectively) are depicted. See Table 4 for the specific areas.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039279.g005
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between the simulated identity states was provided. Controls were
then questioned about how they constructed the two identity
states, whether they encountered difficulties and if so, they were
given support to improve their roles as NIS and TIS. To help the
controls simulate NIS and TIS, they were asked to recall two
experiences they had had earlier in their life, an emotionally
neutral experience and an emotionally painful experience.
Controls were asked to provide their most painful memory to
serve as an analogue for the patients’ personal trauma memories,
as well as a neutral personal episodic memory. Controls were
subsequently instructed how to write the autobiographical
analogue neutral and ‘‘trauma’’ memory scripts. For the
experiment they had to train themselves in being in a neutral
state, the NIS who is unresponsive or under-responsive to the
painful experience, and in being in a state in which they re-
experience the painful memory, the TIS. The consecutive and
final check on the capability to simulate the two different
dissociative identity states consisted in checking whether their
description of their neutral and painful experiences (that was to be
casted in an audiotape recording) met the instructions on how to
enact a DID patient.
In the two or more weeks preceding the PET scans, candidate
control subjects practiced simulating NIS and TIS, as well as
alternating between NIS and TIS using detailed role instructions.
One of the investigators (H.V.) contacted the candidates per
telephone during this preparatory phase to ensure that they
followed the instructions and to offer further suggestions for
optimizing their role performance. One candidate felt unable to
simulate the roles satisfactorily, and was therefore excluded. Prior
to the actual PET scanning, H.V. checked if the candidates
experienced and judged that they were able to simulate the roles of
NIS and TIS. During the actual scanning, he checked if they
engaged in the requested simulations, and immediately after the
role performances, he checked if the controls generally felt they
had simulated the roles of NIS and TIS effectively. All controls
passed these various checks. In addition, immediately after each
text condition, H.V. administered a detailed questionnaire that
inquired after the controls’ subjective sensorimotor and emotional
experiences during their role performance. This questionnaire was
identical to the one in the patient study [39,40], which was
administered by the patients’ therapist, and debriefed six
subjective emotional experiences (fear, sorrow, sadness, anger,
shame and disgust) and ten sensorimotor experiences (visual,
kinesthetic, auditory, olfactory + gustatory reactions, pain, physical
numbness, body stiffening, paralysis and restlessness) were
debriefed. In addition, the presence of the identity state under
investigation and the interference among identity states were also
debriefed. Using this questionnaire, H.V. or the patients’ therapist
could structurally evaluate if the intended NIS or TIS had been
present during the experimental condition. Statistical analyses of
the simulation performance in terms of their subjective experi-
ences, i.e. the subjective sensorimotor perception and emotional
response, during the scanning by the two control groups are
provided in Supporting Information S2.
As we did not have CEQ values for the patients (see also
Supporting Information S1) we could not control for fantasy
proneness by including a covariate. Therefore, the controls were
divided into two groups based on their CEQ scores resulting in a
high fantasy prone group (n =10, age 38.2 (SD 10.9), TEC 0.7
(SD 1.3), SDQ-20 22 (SD 2.4)) with CEQ 13.7 (SD 3.2) and a low
fantasy prone group (n =8, age 42.5 (SD 10.1), TEC 0.4 (SD 0.5),
SDQ-20 20.9 (SD 1.5)), with CEQ 3.9 (SD 1.6). A CEQ cut-off for
high fantasy proneness of 10 was used, which the developers of the
CEQ recommended for the current sample [71].
Patients
A detailed description of the DID patients can be found
elsewhere [39,40]. In short: Eleven patients (all female, age 41.0,
SD 6.1) participated: (i) whose treatment had progressed to Phase
II [72], which involves therapeutic exposure to trauma-related
Figure 6. The brain areas indicated with the blue cross (i.e. the peak voxel) are (from top left to bottom right): the right caudate
nucleus (dorsal part) (2x), the left precuneus, and the right occipitotemporal sulcus. These areas involve the most significant rCBF
difference between the dissociative identity disorder patients and high and low fantasy prone DID simulating controls (CH and CL respectively) and is
shown in both directionality, i.e. the bar graphs, and location, i.e. shown on a coronal overlay (left in the picture is left in the brain). Results show the
differential processing of the trauma-related text between the TIS and the NIS, when comparing the DID groups to the high fantasy prone control
group (left) and low fantasy prone control group (right).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039279.g006
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Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders
(SCID-D [73]), and (iii) had at least one TIS and one NIS that
they could activate on demand [33] and (iv) the involved TIS had
displayed signs of sympathetic nervous system dominance under
perceived threat in clinical situations.
To establish the CEQ values in DID patients an independent
and representative sample of DID patients (n=42) completed the
CEQ. Details regarding this substudy can be found in the
Supporting Information S1.
Stimulus Scripts
During scanning, patients and controls listened to descriptions
of the neutral episodic memories and memories of traumatizing or
most painful events that only TIS experienced as a personal
memory [74]. These memories were cast, prior to the PET session,
by the therapist or one of the principal investigators (H.V.) in
terms of stimulus descriptions, and were subsequently audio-taped
in a neutral tone of voice as 120 second scripts for playback during
the PET investigation.
PET Procedure
The PET (Siemens/CTI ECAT HR+) procedure for the
controls was close to identical to the patients [39,40]. In contrast
to patients the controls did not habituate to the PET environment
prior to the investigation as anxiety levels were expected to be low.
Approximately two hours prior to the PET investigation the
continuous ECG registration was started, obtaining the five
frequency and time domain variables [75,76]. No urine samples
were obtained for the control groups, both medication and drugs
use were verbally debriefed according to standard control research
practice.
For the controls one extra set of the four conditions was added
to increase statistical power. The scanning sequence was therefore
NISn, NISt, TISn, TISt, TISn, TISt, NISn, NISt, TISn, TISt,
NISn and NISt. The last minor character (n or t) denotes the
content of the memory script (MS: neutral or trauma-related). For
patient comfort considerations, i.e. minimizing the number of
identity state switches, a fixed condition order was used, which was
also used for the controls to minimize methodological differences.
Immediately following the end of each script, blood pressure
(systolic and diastolic) and discrete heart rate frequency were
measured and the six subjective emotional and ten sensorimotor
experiences were debriefed. Finally, the presence of the identity
state under investigation and the interference among identity states
were also debriefed.
Image Acquisition and Data Processing
Data acquisition, reconstruction, attenuation correction, spatial
transformation, spatial smoothing (isotropic Gaussian kernel of
12 mm) and global normalization were performed as usual
[39,40,77]. SPM5 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) was used for spatial
transformation to the MNI template (using heavy regularization)
[78,79] and statistical analysis [80] of both patient and control
data.
Data Analysis: Autonomic and Subjective Reactions
Statistical analysis, missing value analysis and principal compo-
nents (PC) analysis were performed with SPSS-PC 15.0 (2006) in an
identical manner as was done for the patient data [39,40]. Results
with p,0.05 are reported as significant. Within SPSS two two-by-
two-by-two factorial designweredefined withthe first factor Group,
consisting of the levels DID and the high fantasy prone controls or
the low fantasy prone controls, a second factor identity state,
consisting of the levels NIS and TIS, and the third factor was MS,
consisting of the levels neutral and trauma-related. For one high
fantasy prone and one low fantasy prone subject heart rate
variability (HRV) data could not be obtained. In addition, the
data, including the PET data, from two NISt conditions was
removed as the control subjects reported not to be able to maintain
as a NIS. One TISn condition was removed from the low fantasy
prone data as the subject reported not to be able to maintain a TIS.
Bonferoni correction to correct for multiple testing was applied.
Data Analysis: PET-data
The patient PET data included in the current study is identical
to the data as included and described in our previous publications
[39,40]. This study assessed various effects, e.g., main effects and
simple subtraction analyses (within and between identity state)
within the DID group using SPM99. This data was re-analyzed in
SPM5 and is referred to as the ‘‘within DID only’’ analyses.
From the 10 high fantasy prone healthy controls the PET data
of one subject was lost due to storage failure at the PET center.
The data of the three groups was statistically analyzed in SPM5 in
a three-by-two-by-two factorial design [81–84]. The general linear
model (GLM) consisted of the three factor main effects, the four
conditions and a group by condition interaction.
In addition, the subjective reactions and the autonomic
reactions were included as group specific covariates of interest
after PC analysis [39,40]. The variance in the subjective ratings
could be described with the first two, six, and five PC for the DID,
high and low fantasy prone groups respectively, explaining 64%,
68%, and 72% of the variance. The variance in the autonomic
reactions could be described with the first three PC for each of the
DID, high and low fantasy prone groups, explaining 85%, 82%,
and 87% of the variance respectively. Finally, the global cerebral
blood flow (CBF) was included as a nuisance covariate (AnCova by
subject).
Hypothesis Testing
Previously reported significant findings were tested using a
between group subtraction of the within group results (e.g.
DID(TISt-NISt)-Control(TISt-NISt)). Commonalities in brain
activation between patients and controls were tested using global
null conjunction analyses [83].
Statistical Inference and Reporting
Our a priori hypothesis was that earlier findings would still hold
after the correction for non-trauma-related factors. Both whole
brain and a priori region of interest (ROI) multiple comparisons
correction were performed on the basis of false discovery rate
statistics [85]. Statistical parametric maps were thresholded using
an uncorrected threshold of p,0.001 [40,86] and explored for a
priori hypothesized brain areas. If an a priori hypothesized brain
area did not survive whole brain multiple comparison correction,
multiple comparisons correction was performed within the a priori
region of interest (ROI). For subcortical located ROI and ROI in
the cerebellum a sphere with a volume of 3054 mm
3 [87] was
used. For larger cortical a priori hypothesised ROI a sphere with a
volume of 6108 mm
3 was used. Note: in line with previously used
statistical thresholds [40] voxels surviving significant levels only
uncorrected for multiple testing for the whole brain, i.e. p,0.001
[40,86] were reported as well, but for comparison purposes only.
Only clusters larger than eight voxels are reported taking into
account the spatial resolution of the PET camera. In contrast to
the earlier publication [40], this time all peak voxels are reported
for a more accurate comparison between groups.
Dissociative Identity Disorder:Fact or Factitious?
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 15 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e39279The coordinates were converted from MNI space to Talairach
space [88] to be defined in Brodmann areas (BA) using both the
Talairach atlas [79] and Deamon [89,90]. Activations in sulci was
defined using Brain Tutor [91]. The location was anatomically
compared to and described using a second brain atlas [92].
Supporting Information
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Supporting Information S2 How well are the dissociative identity
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